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     1 Cf. Altheide, 1989:417: `. . . media are more than a neutral conduit of information
transmission; they are concrete action agents that come to represent or stand for the
location and establishment of various kinds of meanings.'
Introduction
A paper with this `mod est' title poses daunting problems for research and analysis.  The Conference
organizers specified in some de tail the questions they wanted addressed, namely:
a) to assess the current debate on whether communication  has the ab ility to transform  international consciousness,
i.e., is it likely to lead to a less nationalistic world or more?
b) are som e techno logies likely to be m ore conducive to  `consciousness' transformation  than others?
c) how genuine ly global is the spread o f integrated com munications networks and system s?
d) has the communications revolution em pow ered citizens vis-à-vis their states or states 
vis-à-vis their citizens?
e) can you identify any `breakthrough' technologies, in comm unications, that might have a major impact on
international security in the coming decade?
As far as I can tell, their charge was not, however, informed by any knowledge of the state of social science
research in this area.  These questions cut to the heart of scholarly debates that have raged for decades (if not
centuries) without resolution.  What shapes consciousness?  W hat is the relative importance o f ideational facto rs,
structural change, and technology?
To these mind-boggling questions, around which have formed whole sch ools o f thou ght associated  with
figures like Hegel, Marx and W eber, the Conference organizers have added a further concern about international
security at a time when  unp recedented  chan ges are occurring in both global geopolitics and in our conceptualization
of security itself.  Furthermore, they  have  cast one of their que ries in the  future  conditional case.  I am asked not
simply to report on the way the world is now, but in addition to prophesy what it might become in the future.
For the ancient G reeks, the  gift of prophecy, the ability to foresee the future, was given as compensation for
the loss of  `normal' vision .  The prophet could see what lay ahead but could not see what lay around, for he or she
was by necessity blind.  At the risk of total loss of vision, I will confine my attempts at prophecy to a brief section
at the end of the  paper.  To paraph rase W ood y Allen, I will on ly attem pt to predict the futu re `until  I need glasses.'
The Impact of Media on Cultural Dynamics
Communications, culture and  values are related in fascinating ways.  M arshall McLuhan  captu red one
dimension of this relation ship in  his unforgettable aphorism, the medium is the message.  The media through which
people comm unicate affec t profound ly the content of com munication , and a lso the  way in which  content is
interpreted.  Media a re not transparent vessels tha t carry m eanings between people .  On the contrary, they help shape
meaning and thereby exert an im portant influence on  both cu lture and values.1  Indeed , communications scholars use
the term `mediation' (or `mediatization ') to refer to `the impact of the logic and form of any m edium involved in the
comm unication process.' (Altheide, 1989:416)
McLuhan's ideas about comm unications were of course heavily derivative of the work of Harold Adams
Innis, wh o saw communications as the m aterial base  of culture.  His remarkable studies of the historical development
of civilization led him to the conclusion that the mod e of comm unication availab le to a society conditions its
approach to both space and time, thereby giving rise to un ique  cultural epochs and political fo rmations. Thus Innis
distinguished oral from written cultures, and identified the invention of the printing press as the necessary and
suffic ient precon dition  to the emergence of m odernity (Couch, 1990; Lang, 1989).
Innis also saw political institutions as shaped and limited by the available means of communication.  He
distinguished types of polities on the basis of their relationship to both space and tim e, and  this cruc ial relationship
depended in turn on how the available modes of comm unication permitted society to adapt to and  manipulate these
2     2 Cf. Di Norcia, 1990:344.  `Books encouraged the rise of secular knowledge and new
scientific, literary and political elites.  It [sic] also facilitated the victory of the absolute
state over religion in the sixteenth century struggle for social supremacy.'
     3 Kurt Lang (1989:408-9) points out that the Italian sociologist Franco Ferrarotti `is one
of the few sociologists to take Innis as a point of departure and to break new ground by
incorporating elements of his conceptual scheme into their analysis of the television
age.'
     4 Looking back at this work a decade after it was published, Deutsch (1964:46) observed: 
`Students of international affairs have spent years trying to find out why people insist at
certain times upon having a sovereign state of their own which occupies a sharply
bounded area of the world.  They also have been occupied with the motivation of the
rank and file of the population, who often show extreme resistance to their country's
being amalgamated or merged with other governments.'
two dimensions.  Media that were heavy and permanent (such as clay tablets) favoured time over space, and generated
small com pact polities that cherished  history and trad ition.  Lighter m edia  tha t could  be transported eas ily (e .g.,
parch ment) permitted polities to  expand their bou ndaries over large areas, thus m aking possible the em ergence of vast
empires.  Developments in  the techno logy of communication (eg. the invention of the printing press) in his view had
enormous effects on culture and political forms.  Indeed the printing press ushered in the m odern  age of po litics,
permitting the expansion of political participation to the masses, challenging the narrow  hierarch ies of both Church
and S tate, and und erpinning the  emergence of political ideologies.2
Innis' brilliant insights at first escaped the notice of m ost American  politica l scientists3 (although they were
soon picked up by students of comm unication.)  One exception, however, was Karl  Deutsch, whose own work made
severa l contribution s to the  em erging field  of po litical development.
Deutsch's first major publication (in fact a revised version of his doctoral dissertation) was Nationalism and
Social Communication.4  Like many other scholars, Deutsch was concerned with the impact of nationalism on global
political geography in the post World War II period.  In several of his writings he adopted a communications
perspective to unravel the  mystery of nationalism  and  its political consequences:  `If  we look upon nations and
governm ents as communications systems, impersonal, verifiable evidence can be obtained to check general
descriptive or qualitative assertions about nationalism, about sovereignty, and about the merger of states' (Deutsch,
196 4:49 ).  Accordingly, Deutsch `operationalized' comm unication variables in an attempt to understand the
relationship betw een subjective and structural changes.  In his sem inal 1961  article, (`Social M obiliza tion and
Political Developm ent') he formulated a series of hypotheses linking structural change with political and cultural
modernization conceptualized as `social m obiliza tion.'
Deutsch later went on to study political change (specifically integration) in the advanced industrial societies
of Western Europe.  At this point his work m oved from  Co m parative Politics into the domain of International
Relations.  Deutsch examined the relationship between patterns of flow between nations of comm unications, trade,
population and capital, and analyzed how these flows affected both international political structures and political
consc iousness.  Deutsch's assessment of the  prospects of  creating interna tional politica l com munity  was much  more
sophisticated than the rather naive McLuhanesque slogans about the capability of comm unications to transform the
world in to  a `global village '.
In fact, however, Deutsch's writings seemed to point in two different directions at the same time.  Modern
comm unications helped to achieve social mobilization and accelerated the breakdown of paroch ialism.  This in turn
facilitated the growth  of nationalism an d the strengthening of the nation state.  At least this appeared to be the
outcome in the third world.  In the advanced industrial societies of W estern Europe, how ever, com munication  across
state boundaries was help ing to break down these boundaries and fac ilitate supra-national political organization.
3     5 Laxer (1990) traces these developments to economic factors, specifically the creation of
large economic trading blocs:  `Today, because so many decisions have moved beyond
them, nation states are becoming less effective in shaping the socioeconomic conditions
in which their citizens live.  The consequence is the rapid growth in the importance of
two levels of identity — identity at the supranational level and identity at the regional
level — both of which are undercutting the loyalty once directed to the nation state.' 
[James Laxer, `Global Forces leave Canada at U.S. Whim' Toronto Star, Oct. 9 1990,
p.A13].  Cf also Rosenau (1988:333): ". . . the dynamics of post-industrialism are
simultaneously fostering centralizing and decentralizing tendencies in world politics,
some of which cancel each other out but many of which progressively circumscribe
nation-states and the international system they have sustained for several centuries."
Could both  these outcomes really  stem from the same source?  Is communication  the underpinning o f nationalism ,
or of internationalism?
This apparent paradox seems to reflect the ambivalent implications of modern com mun ications, which like
a double-edged blade can cut in two different directions, dependin g at least in part on the general stage of socia l,
econom ic and political modern ization.  Wilbur Schramm, one of the pioneers of modern communications research,
reminds us of two key points.  First, the developm ent of modern mass m edia began five centuries ago and has
involved several epochal changes in the past 50 years.  Second , these deve lopm ents have been drastica lly
`foreshortened' in third world countries, which have been hit all a t once with changes that occurred m uch  more
gradually in the f irst and second world.  For them, `the media tumble over one another as they grow, rather than
following the historical pattern of print, picture, sound, motion, and electronics.'  (Schram m: 1973 , p.221)  These
media  have  a `spectacular' impact on traditional life.  They change the bases of political power, world outlook,
individual aspirations, and the com mo n stock of knowledge.  (See Lerner in Pye, 1963)  Understandably, such
changes are not universally welcomed.  But they are nonetheless significant and influential.  For instance, Schramm
(1973:222) estimates tha t `[w]ithout the profound changes that have taken place in commun ication, sixty new
countries w ould  not be in  ex istence today. ' 
Given the wide divergences found around the globe in respect to mod ernization, it is not surprising that
changes in communications are simultaneously generating both nationalism and internationalism; and depending on
the geopolitical setting, stage of economic development, and historical context, the results include both integration
(as in Europe) and disintegration (as in Canada or the U.S.S.R. where regionalism and separatism appear to be
increasing.)5  Increased comm unication and the spread of mod ern mass media can lead either to cooperation o r to
conflict.  In this respect, the medium is not the message.  Modern media can help disseminate a variety of different
cultural conten ts, including both global and local culture.  Indeed, these two kinds of culture are in heavy competition
with  each  other.
This paradoxical conflict betw een global culture  and local culture is interpreted differently by scholars from
different countries and varying ideological persuasions.  Those at the centre of the global cultural em pire view these
developm ents with sanguinity:
At present what seems to be at work is a complex interaction between a m uch more dynamic, but
not yet clearly institutionalized, international system and the individual nation-states that we have
traditionally viewed  as relatively autonomous.  Sovereignty  still prevails in  som e domains, bu t a
host of international or transnational forces are simultaneously at work, affecting how people act
in what were once conside red to  be domestic affairs, and above all, impinging on the priorities of
governm ent.  All governments are put under pressure by the increasingly significant flows of
international trade, finance , and com munications; by the  effec ts of contem porary science and
technology; and by all the other elem ents that make up what we imprecisely call modernization.
4     6 The `security' implications are obvious, if the term security is expanded to include
culture as well as military considerations.  In this regard, it is interesting to contrast the
duties of the Canadian Secretary of State (charged in many recent cabinets with
responsibility for cultural matters) with the American Secretary of State, whose duties
entail a more traditional conception of national security.  We will return to these issues
in the Conclusion.  For a fascinating case study of Canada by a leading academic who
has also served as chairman of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission, see Meisel, 1986.
But the authoritarian regimes are the m ost vu lnerab le and  are therefore being seriously undermined.
(Pye, 1990:6)
Those on the periphery have a different pe rspective .  They see `modernization' and the spread of global
culture as a threat to the survival  of  their  own indigenous culture.  This is a sentiment Canadians can identify with.
To Canad ians (and m any others as well), so-called global culture is really American culture.  (Nordenstreng and
Schiller, 1979).  In his final speech as Prime M inister, Lester Pearson voiced concern about Canadian autonomy and
sovereignty vis à vis  our southern  neighbours .  W hat worried him  most was neither the  military nor the econom ic
threat, but instead  the "penetration of American ideas, the flow of things American:  American thoughts, Am erican
enterta inm ent, the American approach to everything."  This fear has animated much confl ict between the two
coun tries over regulation of m agazine advertising, cable transmissions, film rights, and a host of o ther issues.6
Am erican culture has a wo rld wide appeal because it is m ass cu lture in a very advanced stage.  Canadians
are no t alone in fea ring it.  Tim e M agazine is the leading m agazine in the  Arab  countries in the M iddle  East!
Global-cum-American culture is also closely tied up w ith cap italist consum erism .  Indeed it is its defining
characteristic.  Although the countries of Eastern Europe can scarcely con tain the ir enthusiasm  for cap italist form s
of deve lopm ent, in the W est cap italism is under attack from  a variety o f perspectives .  Desp ite its world wide appeal,
it is considered problematic by those who are concerned with such global issues as environmentalism, and by the left
which has traditionally fought to am eliorate the `underside' of capitalist deve lopm ent is terms of its effect on  both
class and region.
In an important book on National Sovereignty and International Communication, Nordenstreng and Schiller
(1979:xii) argue vigorously that
the preservation  of na tional sovere ignty may be understood best as a  step in  the larger struggle to
break the domination of the world business system.  In this ongoing effort, international
comm unication has been an extrem ely effective and d irec t agent o f the m arket system. . . .  [T]he
overseers of the  system  have  insisted  that communications are no t only neutral but th at they are
beneficial to receiver societies and individuals everywhere.  This, in brief, is the rationale of those
who have pressed the free flow of information doctrine on the world co mmunity  since the early
1940's.  [emphasis added]
Against the free flow of information advocates, led by the United States, a numb er of countries urged the
adop tion of `prior consent' concerning interna tional broadcasting and com munications:
The advocates of the principle of prior consent argue that the principle of sovereignty gives to a
state the right freely to se lect and develop  it own  politica l, social, econo mic, and cultural system s.
The concept of exchange implies that the flow should  be b ilateral and no t in one direction only.
States have uneven opportunities of using the direct broadcasting technology and this factor
strengthened the need to ensure that activities in  this area are conducted on the basis of prior
con sent.   The oppon ents o f the prior consent p rinciple  [argue]. . . that it would  legitimize
international censorship  and  stifle technological progress. . . (Signitzer, 1976:79  quo ted in
Norenstreng and Schiller, 1979:116)
5     7 The extent of this domination is indicated by the fact that of the 1200 or so news
agencies operating in the world, the four largest Western agencies (Reuters, Agence
France presse [AFP], Associated Press [AP], and United Press International [UPI]
together "put out 34 million words per day and claim to provide nine-tenths of the entire
foreign news output of the world's news papers and television stations [as of the late
1970's]."  Lorimer and McNulty, 1987:232.  According to Hudson (1986:322), "Access
to information, and to the facilities to produce, store, and transmit information is now
considered vital to development, so that the classifications 'information rich' and
'information poor' may mean more than distinctions based on GNP or other traditional
development indicators."
     8 Oledzki (1981/2) reminds us that a parallel concern animated American reactions to the
dominant position of European news agencies in the early 1900's.
Similarly, western domination of news and information7 generated a counter movement of third world and
socia list countries committed to creating a  new  world information  order (NW IO).
Patterned after the  New In ternational Econom ic Order, NW IO (also  referred  to by some authors as a New Information
Order or a New World Information and Comm unication Order) represented the attempt by Third World and other
nations to organize against the hegemonic control of the West.  Its emergence coincided with the attack on the
`deve lopm entalist' paradigm by advocates of the `dependency' perspective and those interested in world systems
theory (Smith, 1985, Wiarda, 1985; Chilcote, 1984; So, 1990).  Drawing on M arxist-Leninist theories of im perialism,
students of dependency argue that the plight of the Third World is only comprehensible when seen as part of the
development of global capitalism, which favours the imperial centres of finance and systematically drains resources
from the peripheral dependent states of the Third World.  Instead of spreading prosperity to all regions of the world,
capitalism enriches th e wealthy nations at the expense of the poor.  
But alongside inequalities in wealth mu st now be placed inequalities in access to and control over
information .  As Ham elink (1985 :146) poin ts out,
Particu larly after the Second World War the international flow of messages was expected to bring
the nations of the world to a better understanding of each other and to the respect for the
sovereignty of ind ividual cou ntr ies .  Meanwhile, sufficien t docum entation has been am assed  to
show that the  interna tional flow is in fact one sided, ethnocentric, and unequally accessible to the
nations.
Western control of the global mass media inspired a growing concern in the Th ird Wo rld with `cultural
imperialism .'  This concern expressed itself in a number of international conferences in the 1970's, and led to various
efforts to `decolonize' information.8  `The  new  interna tional inform ation  order' can be defined as the negotiation of
an interna tional agreem ent fo r a system of relationships between the subjects and objects of international
communication.'  (Oledzki, 1981/2:163.  See also  Argum edo, 1981/2 .)
Technological developments in satellite broadcasting make global comm unication easy to achieve, or
dif ficult  to p revent (depending on  your persp ective .)
The revolution in comm unications has gone far beyond the impact of radio, which Daniel Lerner
(1958) saw as a key instrument for modernization.  The invention of microchips and satellites has
meant not only tha t authoritarian  rulers find  it harder to isolate their countries from the intellectual
and cultural trends sweeping the world bu t that the ir own actions are in stantly p layed  back  to them
and to their peop le.  Thus, Ferdinand M arcos m ade his politica lly fatal mistake of promising an
election while on U.S. telev ision.  The C hinese leaders were initially inh ibited in taking instant
action against the dem onstrating students in Tiananmen Square because of the world wide
television coverage of Gorbachev's visit to Beijing.  The Chinese students demonstrating for
democracy were receiving each day faxed copies o f the ed itorials and news rep orts of the New York
Times, Washington Post, Boston G lobe, Los Angeles Times,  and the San Francisco Chronicle  only
minutes after they reached the streets of U.S. cities.  Indeed, the miracle of satellite television made
6     9 Soedjatmoko (1986:68-9) offers a more cautious assessment:  'People's movements,
organized or unorganized, positive or negative, are significant forces in both the North
and the South.  Some display a grand generosity of spirit such as the Band-Aid fund-
raising concerts . . . In stark contrast to these are the quasi-fascistic movements that
have revived racism, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiment in the industrialized
countries.'
the dream of Tiananmen Square a superspectacle that enthralled and then dismayed a worldwide
pub lic for nearly two m onths and made the Deng-Li clique's attempt at the Big Lie so obscene, so
impossible to get away with.  (Pye 1990: 8)
In many respects, it does indeed appear that `the global information revolution. . .is fuelling dem ocratic
movements around the world. . . .' (Pilat and W hite, 1990:89-90).  Paradoxica lly, how ever, the  health  of democracy
in countries like Canada and the United States is rather problematic.  Voter apathy and political cynicism seem to be
epidemic.  In the 1988 U.S. elections, for example, only 71.1% of the voting age population registered to vote, and
of that group on ly 70.6% actually voted.  In the 1990 mid-term elections, the proportion of the population that
actually voted fell to 36%.
Furthermore, whatever its effects on democratic movements, international comm unication itself requires
`democratization' according to one scholar.  Echoing the observation m ade above that `international capitalism is
shifting into an “informational mode of development”'; and that `inter-state relations are increasingly a matter of
comm unication or culture,' Waterman (1990:78) calls for the development of `“internationalist comm unication” to
give direction and  dynam ism to the struggle against the dominant international communications media and  culture.'
Waterman  notes that there has been considerable growth in `democratic' or `alternative' com munication  globally in
the form of intercourse among various environment, peace, wom en's, human right etc. movem ents.  These ` new social
movem ents' (NSMs) could become the `political force fo r the  development of  inte rna tionalist com munication.'9
(W aterm an, 1990:84; see his `10 propositions.')
Consciousness Transformation
According to Innis, all major developments in  the technology of communication will have an impact on
consc iousness.  While many com mun ication scholars agree with Innis, few have  been  able systematically to `prove'
his contention in any satisfactory way.  Most would agree, however, that of all recent media innovations, television
has had the biggest impact.  Indeed, some have gone so far as to claim that if Gutenberg effected the first great
comm unications revolution with his invention of the printing press, television has ushered in the `second great
comm unications revolution.'  (Kidder, 1986).  We in the West certainly live in a `video culture,' as Kidder calls it.
The impact on our ind ividual and  collec tive consciousness is rather difficult to gauge.  Am ong te levision 's effects
is the tendency to favour `movem ent over stillness, simplification over complexity, specificity over abstraction,
personality over conceptualization, and the present over both past and future.'  (Kidd er, 198 6:60 )  According to
Meyrow itz (1984-viii), television and other electronic media `have altered the significance of time and space for
social interaction.  Echo ing Inn is' analysis of  media  as extensions of the hum an sensory organs, Kurt Lang (1989:409-
410 ) observes tha t:
The audio-visual media are leading the return to a new orality . . . Their mere existence also makes
obsolete the book , the m edium most closely linked  to intellectual progress.  On both these counts,
the ear seems once again to be beating the eye.  But withou t some assistance from the available
technical apparatus, the spoken word does not suffice to reestablish a real dialogue across the
cultural schisms that divide nations and classes.  In bringing the world closer, they have allowed,
or actually condemned, all of us to live much of our lives at a  distance.  They have come between
us and the rich fabric of meaning that goes with direct experience.
7     10 Cf also Couch, 1990: 'All information technologies are, in McLuhan's terms, extensions
of man.  One of the extensions provided by the mass media is procedures whereby one
person can communicate to a multitude.  Print extends the ability of a person to
communicate to a multitude via discursive visual symbols; radio extends the ability of a
person to communicate to a multitude via discursive symbols and evocative auditory
symbols; television extends the ability of a person to communicate to a multitude via
discursive symbols, evocative auditory symbols, and evocative images.'  By the same
token, audience and viewer ratings (such as the Nielsen ratings) allow the many to send
a message back to the few who decide what programs will be aired.
     11 This theme is repeated by Couch (1990:125):  `Hitler's totalitarianism was bolstered by
his access to and effective use of the radio to establish and maintain a state structure
infused with charisma.  More recently Khomeini effectively used television to establish
and maintain a totalitarian regime infused with charisma.'
Lang's nostalgia for the age of  ` direct experience' may seem a trifle unrealistic if no t atavistic.  W e are clearly
not likely to go `back' from the age of ` new orality' ushered in by mod ern electronic media.  But where are we going?
What lies ahead?  How  will the comm unications revolution affect the relative balance of power between states and
citizens?  How w ill it affect international security?
Comm unications and Empowerment
The deve lopm ent of modern m ass m edia  has had an ambivalent impact on political power.  Early theorists
of `mass society' like C. Wright Mills believed that modern media would lead to public apathy and the destruction
of dem ocracy.  The town m eeting, the hallmark of American democracy, allowed two-way comm unication between
leaders and  citizens.  Everyo ne co uld listen and speak as issues of common concern were debated  in small gatherings.
According to Mills, broadcasting changed all this forever, because  it afforded `tremendous opp ortunities for mass
hearing, but not mass participation.'  Instead it crea ted huge au diences ` where c itizens are mere spectators o r auditors
of the elite few who speak.' (Peters, 1989: 214)10
M ills' critics rejected his lament for democracy, arguing that he had ignored the actual pattern of social
interaction found in so-called `mass society'.  Challenging the m ass socie ty view of m edia as a giant hypoderm ic
needle injecting information into a passive, mass society, theorists of the `two-step' mo del claimed to have
`discovered' that people  really interact face-to-fac t in sm all groups guided by  opin ion leaders who are well informed
by the mass m edia.  `The m edia could therefore be seen not as usurpers of the public space (as M ills and a wh ole
range of mass-society critics saw them) but as contributors to it:  the media provided material for discussion via the
first step of the two-step flow.' (Peters, 1989: 215)
If theorists disagreed about the impact of m ass media on democracy, they were much nearer consensus that
these media  would enhance the power of authoritarian regimes.11  The availability of the means of mass persuasion
and control had facilitated the appearance of a new form of tyranny called `totalitarianism' about which much was
written in the years following World War II.  Perhaps the most influential of these works, George Orwell's 1984,
prophesied a grim society in which The Party (personified by Big Brother) used the then futuristic technology of
television as an  instrum ent of surveillance  and  total control.  `Big B rother is watching you' was a by-w ord o f this
terrifying future world.  A t regu lar in tervals, dutiful sub jects would  be summoned to huge TV screens  where Big
Brother's image and voice would boom out, shaping the thoughts and emotions of his defenceless, pathetic audience.
Neither Orw ell nor Mills could not have anticipated the subsequent development of television as a medium
of enterta inm ent and commercializa tion.  Its impact on politics has follow ed these primary tendencies, resulting in
the comm ercialization of electioneering and the trivialization of politica l debate.  Bu t television  has a lso had a m ore
subtle impact on political cu lture tha t is best captured in M cluhan's overworked but underdeveloped notion of the
8     12 Some scholars argue that the print medium, particularly newspapers, played an even
larger role in delegitimating U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  More will be said on this
topic in the Conclusion.
     13 Cf also his conclusion:  `Western TV in East Germany has a “soma effect”, as in
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World:  Short-term satisfaction through relaxation
provided by western TV.  The long-term effects of western TV, however, were not
system stabilizing.  Western TV regularly conveyed another world.  This was not only a
dream-world, which facilitated escape from everyday life, but was also a spur to
compare realities and act on them.  In October 1989 the people of the GDR decided that
the time for action had come.  This “October Revolution” would not have happened at
that time and in that way without the continual influence of western media, in particular
western TV.'
     14 Several scholars have pointed out that television may facilitate two-way communication
between the political elite and the mass public if certain recent technological innova-
tions are encouraged.  `Video text' (and other recent equivalent technologies) now make
it possible for the opinion of the `silent majority' to be systematically monitored, thus
permitting the development of `teledemocracy.'  See, inter alia, Kidder, 1986; Becker,
1981.
global village.  Horrible images from the Vietnam W ar broadcast daily into millions of American  hom es ultim ately
eroded the legitimacy of American invo lvem ent.12  Images of W estern a ffluen ce pro jected  into hom es in Eastern
Europe ultimately ignited the liberalization movement of 1989.  Hesse (1990:355) describes the impact of television
in  term s of the achievement of `electronic unification':
In divided Germany in recent years an `electron ic reun ification ' took place in front o f the TV se ts
day-by-day.  People in the Germ an Dem ocratic Republic (GDR ) received information and
entertainm ent from  the western media.  For the GDR  rulers, this created difficult problems.  The
collapse of the Honecker regime had m any sources of course; but an important factor in the p rocess
of political change was the influence of West German TV, which has an excellent image in East
Germ any, for the  qua lity and credibility of its news and current affairs programmes.  East Germans
shaped their  picture of the world under the continuous influence of western TV.13
Thus television has not alw ays reinforced the  power and  inf luence of estab lished political regim es.  Nor have
other mod ern media.  According to Di Norcia, (1990:354:)  `Power and Knowledge meet in comm unications media.
They both encode knowledge and mediate the struggle for social supremacy.  User-friendly interpretive codes and
easily accessible m edia abet dem ocratic  groups; difficu lt codes and less accessible m edia facilitate  elite  control.'
Photocopying technology made possible the publication of the Pen tagon Papers and  coun tless other sensitive secret
documents.  The fax machine allowed sympathisers around the globe to comm unicate precise information to the
Chinese students who were occupying Tienemen Square.  The slogan  `Fax the truth to  China' was heard from H ong
Kong to London.  Modern media have been as often instruments of liberation as of enslavement.  They have allowed
the people to `talk back' to their would-be rulers, and to see and talk to each other around the world.14
Integrated Communications Networks
The capability of u sing the  sam e com munications netw ork to  transm it a variety of types of information or
data  —  for example voice, computer data, and printed material — has given rise to the development and diffusion
of `integrated' comm unications networks.  Such networks are spreading throughout the globe, virtually where ever
telephone linkages exist.  Geographical b arriers are easily transcended because most long distance telephone
9     15 `Currently, two modes of transfer for international telecommunications exist — satellite
and submarine cable.  Global satellite communication operations are governed by
INTELSAT, a 110-nation organization that owns and operates the fifteen-satellite
system.  INTELSAT carries about two-thirds of the world's transoceanic communica-
tions traffic and almost all international television transmission.'  (Barfield and Benko,
1985:17)
     16 The term `East-West' is becoming increasingly irrelevant as the two sides grow closer
economically and politically.  The ultimate symbol of its growing irrelevance is surely
the unification of East and West Germany that took place in October, 1990.
conne ctions are now via satellite.15  The fax machine and the modem  now make possible virtually instant
sophisticated connections be tween  individua ls, and have facilitated access to computer-based data bank and decision
centres.  This access, moreover, is two way.  The remote user can tap into these sources for financial, scientific or
even military information.  The clever user can also input information and in some instances manipulate the source
itself by breaking through security codes.  Num erous examples of the work of `computer hackers' have been
docum ented in court cases and fictionalized in novels and films.  The rather terrifying possibility of breaking
computer security for nefarious personal or politica l purposes obviously has implications for international security.
It is both  an `East-W est'16 security matter and a ho t issue in `North-South' relations.
Viewed in bo th contexts, integrated com munications netw orks and the  consequent ab ility to transm it
information around the globe almost instantly affect international econom ics as m uch  as po litics.  Acco rding to
Walter Wriston, former Chairman of the  Board of Citibank, `An individual sitting anyw here in  the world before  his
[sic] PC can comm and in microseconds incredible amounts of information stored in the data base of the world.
Information. . .is becoming the new capital. '  (Quoted in Barfield and Benko, 1985:11)
With regard to trade and economics, McCracken and  Esch (1985 :3) refer explicitly to the North-South
discussion but their question applies more generally as well:  "Can the developed and the developing countries agree
on international comm unication and information systems that provide the open infrastructure needed for trade and
comm erce to flourish across boundaries, while protecting individual rights and the sovereignty and security of
nations?"
Whenever econ om ic and  financial concerns are raised, political and military considerations can't be for
behind.  In a care ful assessment of the plethora of international policy problems passed by the comm unications
revolu tion.  Barfield and B enko (1985:18-19) emphasize the  follow ing:
Privacy and data protection.  Concern about the potential Orwellian misuse of advanced computer
technologies led many nations to adopt privacy and data protection measures in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.  In 1980 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and D evelopm ent (OECD ) also
passed its guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data in an
attempt to establish som e universally agreed upon  principles to promote the harmonization of
national privacy laws.  Debate still exists, however, on the scope of protection and government
information access afforded by these laws.  In particular, some national laws consider corporations
to be included under their coverage, raising the potential for misuse of proprietary information.
Economic and national sovereignty restrictions.  Most nations view economic power as a key
component of national pow er and therefore consider econom ic restrictions in the interest of national
sovereignty.  All barriers to the flow of information that result from government monopolization
of the national com munications network, for example, can be  construed  as econom ic restrictions,
since PTTs themselves are justified in such terms.  The Canadian Bank Act of 1980, which requires
all customer data  to be  stored  and  processed  in Canada, is a restriction on transborder data flow
designed to safeguard  national econo mic interests.  So too are West German Bundespost regulations
that require local data processing of information.  French threats to tax the value of incoming
information  flows directly a re another example of an explicitly economic restriction advanced in
the nam e of national sovereignty.
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     17 Cf. Lipset (1985:329) who points out that social scientists "cannot possibly" anticipate
"specific outcomes" because "we are still in a situation comparable to that of the
meteorologists--they can describe what is happening to produce a cold wave or a
drought; they can look at yesterday's weather and predict tomorrow's; but they do not
understand enough about the complex relations among the many forces that produce
diverse weather to make reliable long-term predictions."
National security.  National security con trols include the obvious restrictions on the flow of
strategically  sensitive military information.  Included in this category is the information emb odied
in some high-technology goods and se rvices.  The U.S. Export Adm inistration Act, for example,
places strict con trols on  the export of such information by limiting the export of sensitive goods.
Other security controls stem from the so-called vulnerability issue.  Foreign countries are
designating an expanding list of data bases and  types o f information  as vital to the national security
and, as a consequence, requiring that this information be stored within the country's borders and
that certain operations on, and manipulations of, these data bases be locatized and monitored.
Cultural restrictions.  Nations impose restrictions on transborder data flows to preserve the ` cultural
integrity' of the ir society.  The developing nations in particular cite cultural sovereignty and
econom ic development as interrelated goals and use them both as focal points for their demand for
a `new world information and co m munications order.'  They call for restrictions on the flow of
information from the industrialized N orth, in a ll its forms, to halt `cultural imperialism.'  They also
seek strict control over the information leaving their borders, ostensibly to stop the allegedly biased
press of the industrial world from p erpetuating myths about the less-developed countries that, they
argue, help solidify and perpetuate dependency and underdevelopment.  Industrialized nations also
fear the potential effect of global comm unications technology on their cultural development.
Canada has imposed restrictions in the radio and television industries, limiting foreign (United
States) advertising and program content.  Article IV of the GATT itself permits restrictions on
information flows through films for reasons of cultural integrity.
Each of these four policy areas has enormous im plications for internation al security, becau se each could
generate friction and conflict between nation states.  We will return to some of these issues in the Conclusion.
`Breakthrough' Technologies and Future Changes in International Security
Social scientists d istinguish  several different types of statements about the future, including prediction
(literally an attempt to `say' what lies ahead, usually based on an explanatory mode l or theo ry); projection (literally
a `throwing' ahead of recent trends and developments); and forecasting (a rather ambiguous term that derives from
meteoro logy.)  None of the se is very  reliable in  interna tional politics (even less  than  in weathe r).17  Ten  years ago
virtually no one predicted the `tectonic shifts' in the global geopolitical `plates' that have  brought East and  West so
close together.  Nor would projections of various trends current at that time have yielded an accurate forecast of what
in fact has transpired.
Each of us could speculate as to why recent events have taken most people by surprise.  If we narrow our
focus to the topic  of this paper, two shortcomings in theory and analysis leap out.  First, com munication  theorists did
not anticipate the development and diffusion of the technologies that have become so important in the 1980 's, viz.
fax, VCR, personal compu ters, etc.  More to the point, theorists could not have predicted how these technologies
appear to have affected societies around the globe.
In light of these enormous, virtually unpredictab le changes in global geopolitics, it is not surprising that our
understanding of the concept security is itself changing.  The `realist' approach to security, which has remained the
dominant conception for over two centuries, has been seriously challenged.
For some, this challenge has reflected the more global view — graphically illustrated by p ictures o f Earth
taken from  outer space  —  that sees all Earthlings as sh aring a  comm on stake in global survival.  We are all in the
11
     18 Several of the above paragraphs previously appeared in Bell, 1990.
same boat in m any respects.  And we cannot make our end of the canoe more stable by trying to make the other end
more tippy, as Roger Fisher has pu t it.
Nor is security a simple, straightfo rward  matter of defence and m ilitary strategy.  Threats to security are seen
increasingly in non-military areas, especially in our relationship to our fragile world eco-system, and in the patterns
of global economic developm ent that have proved so damaging to the environm ent.  The linkage between these crises
occasioned the establishment of the World Comm ission on Environment and Development, headed by  Gro
Brundtland, whose 1987 report was called Our Common Future.
Brundtland had been a mem ber of the group established by fellow Scandinavian, Olaf Palme, who
popularized the parallel no tion o f com mon security five  years ea rlier in the title of the Report of the Independent
Com mission on Disarmam ent and Security Issues.  In the Prologue to the Report, Cyrus Vance wrote:
There is one  overrid ing truth  in this nuclear age — no nation can achieve  true security by itself. . .
The fact is that there are no real defenses against nuclear armed missiles —  neither now nor in the
foreseeable future.  To guarantee our own  security in this nuclear age, we m ust . . . work together
with other nations to achieve common security.  (p. vii) [emphasis added]
In his Introduction, Palm e outlined the im plications o f this  ` ove rrid ing tru th .'  The doctrine of mutual assured
destruction, with its corollary requirem ent of an  ever-expanding arsenal of weap ons and the resulting ` nuclear balance
of terror', must be repudiated  in favour of a  conception o f international security based on `a comm itment to joint
survival rather than on a  threat of mutua l destruc tion.' (p. xiii)  This in turn requires a reversal of the arms race, in fact
`a downward spiral in armaments,' including conventional as well as weapons of mass destruction.
The development of m ilitary technologies of m ass destruction has made total war unthinkable as a `rational
instrument of statecraft' and has necessitated a reconceptualization of security itself.  The notion of ` comm on security'
was propounded to address both the military and the broader economic and environm ental aspec ts of security.  In a
follow-up report, written in 1989  several years afte r the death of their Chairm an, Palm e Com mission m em bers
expressed the hope that ultimately `com mon secu rity could evolve from a concept intended to pro tect against war to
a comprehensive approach to world peace, social justice, econ om ic development, and environm ental p rotection.'18
(A World at Peace. p. 7)
One fairly safe `prediction' regarding international security in the com ing decade is that this expanded
definition of the concept wil l achieve much greater currency.  Environmental  and economic concerns will be
juxtaposed with military concerns.  Furthermore problems associated with  cultural security (as discussed earlier in
this paper) will also  achieve greater salience.  All of  these issues, which  are clearly international collective goods of
one kind or another, entail a strong imp erative of multilateralism, wh ich Barfield and Benko (1985:19) insist  ` remains
the  best hope fo r solving em erging p rob lem s in the  inte rna tional . . . system .'
Conclusion: Implications for International Security
What are some other implications of the developments described above?  How w ill they affect international
security now and in the foreseeable future?  Notwithstanding the delicate caveats articulated earlier concerning the
dangers of p rophecy, it is possible to speculate about future developments on the basis of our previous discussion.
W e might begin by reiterating the point made in the title of the posthum ous book by Ith iel de Sola Pool (1990 ):
m odern  comm unications systems are indeed "technologies without boundaries."  They therefore pose difficult
challenges to the integrity and sovereignty of traditional nation states, w hich  define their very existence in terms of
boundaries that can somehow be "secured."  For example, Louis Delvoie (1990) defines Canadian  national security
as "surveillance and control over land, sea and air approaches to Canada."  But, as Nazli Chou cri (1990) so e loquently
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     19 "TBF" is the abbreviation of "trans-border data flow," a recognized problem in instruc-
tional security.  See inter alia, Meisel, 1986.
     20 Theorists who endorse the first image usually argue that aggression is a biological (i.e.
innate) rather than a cultural (i.e. learned) behavioral disposition.  Many argue further
that its biological basis makes aggression impossible to eliminate.  For a particularly
compelling elaboration of this thesis, see Ardrey (1966) who identifies the development
of tools/weapons by Australopithecus, an early human-like ancestor, as a crucial stage
in the evolution of the species Homo sapiens.  Note however that his theories have
generated considerable scientific controversy.
     21 As of 1990, only 67% of Soviet  households had radios, 35% televisions, and a mere 15% telephones.  At
best, the Soviet Union would be placed near the bottom of the list of "mod ernized" societies as far as comm unica-
tions are concerned.
pointed out, all contemporary nation states have d isplayed "m assive incom petence in con trolling the flow of goods,
services, hum an beings an d effluent" across their boundaries.  In this age of satellites and fibre optics, comm unica-
tions and data must be added to this list of things that are flowing across national boundaries with little "surveillance"
and even less "control." 19  Thus m odern com mu nications appear to have the potential to undermine national security.
But this conclusion is too facile and simplistic.  To appreciate more fully the impact of Comm unications on
Security, it is helpful to recall Kenneth Waltz's "three images" of the causes of international war.  Waltz identified
three distinct foci for theories of war and peace:  human  nature, political regimes within states, and the state system
itself.  Each of these images derives from a different assumption about the root cause of war.  The first image explains
war in term s of "hum an nature"  -- the natural propensity to aggress ion and v iolence tha t is deep ly engrained in  the
hum an psyche.20  If  we wish to eliminate war we must transform human nature, according to th is persp ective .  The
second image theorists argue (as did Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace)  that wars are caused not by hum an nature
but by autocratic rulers who act "irresponsibly" to com mit their sub jects to  war.  Kant believed that once all states
were democratised, wars would disappear because "the people" would never choose such a painfu l and costly course
of action for solving conflict.  Finally, the third image theorists assume that war is a product of the state system itself.
Sovereign states, irrespective of their form  of governm ent, will inevitably clash vio lently with one another because
they lack a higher sovereign power to keep them "in Awe", to enfo rce agreements, and to punish  transgresso rs (to
borrow from Thomas Hobbes' unforgettable analysis of the "State of War.")  To eliminate war we must either
eliminate international anarchy by introducing some form of world governm ent; or eliminate nation states and revert
to smaller, less dangerous and powerful political units; or perhaps abolish and eliminate weapons, the means of
warfare.
W e can adap t this fram ework for our purposes, and explore the impact of modern communications on m ass
publics, political elites, and the state system .  Looking ahead to the future , how will m odern comm unications affect
a) the propensity of mass publics to support (or perhaps demand) armed international conflict; b) the likelihood of
elites to continue  to choose this policy op tion; and c ) the nature of the  international system  of sovereign states?
a) Comm unication and Mass Publics
In third world countries (perhaps including the Soviet Union)21 comm unications will increase "social
mobiliza tion."   This may either expand national power, or accelerate fragmentation through heightened regional or
ethn ic conflict, depending on the particular circumstances.  We are living through a period of extraordinary national
and subnational consciousness and conflict.  Instead of eroding cleavages based on these "p rimordial" affiliations,
modernization and industrialization seem to have  sharpened them.  Thus "m ost of  the m ultilingual, bi-national, or
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     22 For a strong critique of the limitations and distortion this entails, see Fletcher, 1990.
     23 As the world approached the deadline of January 15, 1991 on which the United Nations
sanction for military action against Iraq took effect, public opinion in all countries
actively involved in the conflict, though divided, was broadly supportive of war, and
yet concerned about the potential costs in human lives and material destruction.
bi-religious states that have persisted for many decades, if not centuries, have faced turmoil in recent years."  (Lipset,
1985: 336)  This generalization applies to East and West, North and South.
In addition to  exacerba ting social cleavages and antagonisms, in advanced western coun tries, mod ern
comm unications appear to be a) fragmenting audiences, by permitting the expansion of specialized media and
programming; b) eroding na tional bou ndaries, because of the impossibility of regulating the flow of communications
across boundaries; c) increasing political cynicism, by exposing government action (and inaction) to public scrutiny;
d) raising consciousness about issues like environmental degradation that cut across national bound aries.  (Pool,
199 0:262).  It is unclear whether  on balance comm unications have served to empower citizens or states.  Probably
they have the potential for both.  In any given situation, the outcome will be a function of leadership, will, and skill
in using com munication  systems.
One comm unications-related development that has definitely strengthened vox pop uli (the voice of the
people) is the technology of public opinion surveying, which has become perh aps th e foremost instrument of
democracy.  Governments use surveys on a regular basis to take the pulse of publics on issues and policies.22  This
practice is so advanced that Wriston (1990) identifies as the three participants in "political comm unication"
politicians, the m edia, and the  "mass public speaking through polls."  Insofar as pub lic policy (especially in w estern
"dem ocracies") must ultim ately respond  to public opinion, it is crucial to recognize that the public's conception of
security appears to be changing:
Security for individual people is very different from 'national security.'  Individual people need
food, shelter, employment, health care, and education in order to be secure.  The metaphorical
motion of 'national security' [i.e. which relies on the state-as-person m etaphor] means spending less
on what makes individual people secure.
(Chilton and Lakoff, n-d.: 16)
The "traditional" conception of national security is neither god-given, natural, nor eternal.  It is a social
construct rooted  in a pa rticular histo rical conjuncture in  the developm ent of the m odern state system.  It has played
a role that is becoming increasingly outdated, particularly in the post-cold war era.  As Keohane and Nye (1977:6-7)
pointed out more than a decade ago,
National security symbo lism w as largely a product of the Cold War and the severe threat Am ericans
then felt.  Its persuasiveness was increased by realist analysis, which insisted that national security
is the prim ary national goal and  tha t in inte rna tional po litics security threats are permanent. . . 
As the  Cold  War sense of security threat slackened . . . [t]he intellectual ambiguity of 'national
security' became m ore  pronounced . . .
The "construct" of national security is being deconstructed, perhaps more rapidly by mass publics than
political elites.  But will these new, broader conceptions of security increase or diminish the prospects for
international war?  Will modern comm unications make it easier or m ore difficu lt to mobilize  mass publics to  supp ort
war?  Wh at type of war are we likely to see?23
It would be naive to  assum e that better global com munications and  a broadened  conception o f security will
somehow eliminate war or lead to  greater internation al cooperation.  Indeed, the  opposite result is just as  likely.  M ore
issues, not fewer, will becom e po liticized.  M ore vo ices will be heard, and a grea ter sense  of urgency will likely
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     24 Cf. Meisel, 1986:328, "As telecommunications becomes increasingly fundamental to
the national interests of developing countries, and as the basic components of the
infrastructure become more affordable, global competition for orbit and spectrum
resources will become more intense.  If this prospect brings about changes in values and
foreign policies, then collective solutions may be found.  If not, competition may well
lead to intense conflict."
     25 Cf. Soedjatmoko, 1986:72, "In short, modern technologies of communication and
transportation, to say nothing of a pervasive commercial culture, have added a new
stratification of the world; people into transnational classes that share very little
information, experience, or common concern.  The psychological distance between the
strata is in imminent danger of reaching the point where the only form of discourse
between top and bottom is violence, punctuated by occasional spasms of charity."
develop.  The cha llenge o f peace will be greater than ever.24  This challenge is further com plicated by  what appears
to be a desecularization of values that is occurring countries all around the globe.  Religious fundamentalism is on
the rise in the  Middle  East and in  the United  States.  The C hurch is experienc ing a revival in  centra l and  eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union.  These changes may permit the articulation of an "ethical core . . . on which a wider
consensus can be built" around "intangible but fundamental human values -- a sense of cultural identity, a demand
for participation, a respect for religion, an insistence on hum an right and justice."  (Soedjatmoko 1986:68).  But
religion in the past has  more often been a source of  conflict than  of ha rmony.  A single  world religion, or even a
greater spirit of ecumenicism, seems so remote as to be unthinkable.  Hence we can take little comfort from the
resurgence of religion.
Furtherm ore if any conclusion can be drawn from the Gulf War, the televised coverage of such
techn om arvels as stealth bom bers, smart bom bs, and  cruise m issiles induced in the public a kind of "technological
euphoria" that shifted attention away from the brutal destruction of human beings and the environment, blinded the
pub lic to the enormou s material cost of war, and contributed to the astoundingly wide support of the war by 91% of
the Am erican public.  If there was ever any doubt that the contemporary western viewer could be mobilized behind
a future war against a third world country, the Gulf War melted it down.
b) Comm unication and Political Elites
Modern com munications make it possible for elites in  nearly  every coun try to comm unicate with each other
extensively, instantaneously, and interactively.  But will they do so?  And if they do, what effect will this have?
It appears that global (or at least international) comm unication links are widespread and growing among
econom ic and sc ien tific  elite s.  The result  has been a proliferation o f inform al and fo rmal professional communities,
invisible colleges, collaborative research, and so on.  Will political and bureaucratic elites develop similar
relationships with their colleagues in other countries?  Will this encourage greater understanding, value convergence
and closer coop eration?  W ill political e lites learn to  "see"  security more broadly, and at the same time com e to
appreciate the "comm on good" attributes of m any interna tional security issues?  C an they learn  to overcome various
perceptual pathologies (ideological, cultural, religious, etc.) that have reinforced destructive attitudes toward other
people and the rest of Nature?  If elites learn a new com mon  culture will this simply expand the gap between them
and the m asses?   Do not w ealthy  elites in N orth an d South have m ore in com mon w ith each other than with the
growing number of poor and  under privileged in both se ttings?  A nd is  this no t a potentially explosive development? 25
These questions force us to shift our forcus to a higher level of analysis, to assess the impact of
com mu nications on the state system itself.
c) Global Comm unication, Values, And The Transformation Of The International System
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     26 I harbour no illusions about the effects of television programming as it presently exists. 
Hence the emphasis on potential.
To conclude this pap er with  a discussion of ho w the state sys tem  itself is being transformed by (post)
modernization permits a synthesis of the many disparate strands of our agreement.  Not surprisingly, the changes that
are occurring in the international system are mirrored in new fo rmulations of the theory of international relations,
especially by "post modernist" writers and those attempting to construct "critical theory."  But the ramifications can
be seen across the discipline.  James Rosenau, for example, writes of the challenge to the "state centric" international
system posed by the newly emerging "multi centric" systems which comp rises diverse "subnational and supranational
sovereignty-free" actors that are "relatively equal."  This change has rendered bo th the realist and the neorealist
parad igm of internation al relations prob lem atic, if not entirely anachronistic.  However, the  engine of change
propelling us into this new age is the electronic revolution and the transformation of communications and information
technology.  Rosenau calls on students of international polities to break out of the  old paradigm s and  beco me aware
of the realities of this new second "world of world po litics," whose structure and process is distinctive in numerous
ways.
Robert Cox (1991) sounds a similar note in his discussion of the impact on territorial states of various "global
forces" that characterize the emergence of a "post globalization world order" which might entail the "possibility of
culturally diverse alternatives to global homogenization."  And even Alvin Toffler has written on the "Powershift"
that has m ade access to "electronic knowledge", not wealth o r military might, the key facto r in the new world order.
The "world of world politics" has obviously become dram atically more com plex.  New structures have appeared at
levels both above and below that of the nation state.  The idea that territoriality is a defining characteristic of political
association (i.e. statehood) may be overtaken by new types/political association based on shared comm unications (no
longer dependent on geographical propinquity).
Will the developm ent of global markets, global actors, global structures and global problems be accompanied
by a new  global consciousness?  Such a d evelopm ent is probably a precond ition to  a harm onious new w orld order.
As Karl Deutsch once remarked , "noth ing m ore is required  for world governm ent than that the peop le of each co untry
have as much concern for each other as the people of Alabama have for the people of Massachusetts."  But he went
on  to add , "noth ing less  is requ ired  also ."
If any m edium has the po tential o f producing som e form  of hum ane global consciousness, it must surely be
television.26  Because it is  prim arily  a visual m edium , its im pact can transcend  language.  Everyone in the  world can
see the same image, and they can do so simultaneously.  Moreover we are witnessing for the first time  in history the
appearance of a "v ideo  genera tion."  B y the tim e individuals graduate from  high schoo l in advanced western societies
they have spent more time  in front of a television set than they have spent in school.  For them television - not the
family, not the educational system, not religion, and not books and newspapers -- has become the primary agency of
political (and genera l) socializa tion.  Youn gsters growing up  in the age of satellites have the potential to experience
a truly global television  upb ringing.  None  of the  mem bers of this video gen eration  is yet "in charge" of m ajor social,
scientific, econ om ic, or political institutions.  Bu t they soon w ill be.  The p resent elite, whose "first culture" (cf. "first
language") is print -- which reinforces (indeed helped create) the conception of the territorial nation state and the
paradigm s of realism and neorealism  -- will soon  be d isplaced by  an elite w hose "first culture" is video -- which  is
tied in with other glob al forces; which transcends language; which d issolves  history and trad ition; which  is
increasingly the dom inating force in  both  popular cu lture (through soap operas, TV dramas and sitcoms) and political
com munication  (through news and public  affairs program ming).
16
     27 Cf. Boulding, 1988, who uses the concept "global civic culture" to refer to a similar
type of cultural mutation.
Our hope for the future lies in the possibility that in  the twenty-first century both  elites and m asses w ill
experience a cultu ral mutation  that will lead to a  new  global consciousness  -- and sense of global citizenship and
responsib ility -- capab le of sustaining hu man existence and the world environm ent on w hich it depends.27
But the likelihood of this  creative transformation is  sligh t at best .  We are m oving to a new w orld order, to
be sure.  But is a world order of unipolar militarism sustained by financial "tribute" ( i.e. O PM -- other people 's
money) and dominated by the military might of the United States operating under the guise of the United Nations.
Despite staggering developmental problems in the third world, the second world, and the first world, we appear to
be emb arking on a course of further hu ge investment in military weaponry and technology.  As Richard Nixon
astute ly predicted, the war in  the  Gu lf is but th e first exam ple  of the  phenom enon  of "Third W orld W ar."
In 1989, the N ew York Tim es wrote an obituary for the New World Inform ation  Order, which it officially
declared dead.  The NWIO d ied not of natural causes but as a result of a relentless series of attacks, amounting to a
war, conducted by the United Sta tes under the  banner of "freedom  of inform ation ."  The  United Sta tes succeeded in
labelling NW IO as comm unist-inspired anti-democratic censorship.  At the same time, the United States was
advancing the cause of "freedom" through what it called a "strategic comm unications initiative."  The New W orld
Order, George Bush style, will feature a sophisticated use of state-of-the- art comm unications technology put to the
service of global im perial inte rests.  Through SCI, the United States may achieve successes beyond the wildest dreams
of the  supp orters of  SDI.  They make succeed in creating a  new  Military Inform ation  Society (M osco , 1991).
Pax Am ericana is undou bted ly prefe rable to  a number of alternative futures.  But it represents the defeat of
more hopeful vision of a world order, one based on decreased militarism, increased mutual understanding, and a
global comm itment to tackling seriously the problems of the environment, of poverty and starvation; a world order
built on technological developments that are life sustaining rather than life destroying.
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